

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS



## U.S. Foreign Policy and Democratic Development in Latin America

Third Edition

PREPARED FOR  
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
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# Latin America



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# National Security Issues and the United States Economic Embargo to Cuba; Analysis of a Special Relationship

*José Enrico Valenzuela Alvarado*

Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, fissures that represent fundamental differences in the organization of society characterize the relationship between the United States and Cuba. This confrontation is almost forty-years old.

Using the difference of ideology on both sides as a starting point, the facts help to explain the fissures that exist between the two nations. A critical analysis of these facts provides a possible rational solution to the persistent dilemma.

Understanding the specific aspects of this complex relationship, is a requirement to observe the pillars on which it is sustained. For example, the US economic embargo rests on national security factors. If it is visualized as the big capitalist/communist picture, understanding the differences between Cuba and the US will be easier.

In Act I of the play, the CIA violates Cuban airspace. For this play, the CIA begins its performance in Act I, 1959. The principal rationale was because Cuba was a threat to the United States and to the Monroe Doctrine. The US attempted to enforce the "America for the Americans" (e.g., main argument of the Monroe Doctrine).

During the enforcement of this Doctrine, some events took place. The destruction of Cuban sugar cane fields and mills, the invasion of

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Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) and the Cuban missile crisis literally set the stage for the events in Act 2.

When the events are mentioned, the critical analysis of the Cuban government's response to the United States pressure needs critical analysis. The Cuban response will be examined in Act 2. The enforcement of the embargo opens Act 3.

The economic embargo on Cuba will be revealed during Act 3 of the play. Did Act 3 show the failure of Act 1? Probably, because the achievement of Act 3 underscores the goals of the United States in Cuba. Now, the action stalls for more than thirty-five years and Act 3 is still playing. The Helms-Burton Act illustrates how extreme measures are carried out. The US raised the embargo to new levels, which some would call extreme by targeting third party nations. The US, in a law approved by both chambers of Congress and signed by the President, is prepared to bring legal sanctions against third parties who would dare not conforming to US domestic law. The disputes between the European Union (EU) and the US before the World Trade Organization (WTO) represents an example of how the extraterritoriality of a domestic law hurts a strong economic block.

In Act 4 of the play, this and other questions asked during the construction of the play can be answered. Obviously, with the help of the author that tries to organize the play in the best way. The actors in Act 4 are the lifting of the US embargo proposal and the Catholic Church's openness toward Cuba. These actors serve in the play as evidence of how extreme measures are smoothed.

Act 4 makes the play more interesting because it shows how Congress has the initiative to eliminate the long-term extreme measures that cast Fidel Castro as David and the United States as Goliath. Finally, that cast Fidel Castro as David and the United States as Goliath. Finally, describing in detail the performance of the actors during the different acts of the play is necessary. The author uses the best sources for a great performance of the actors, the facts and critical analysis.

So, now the play begins.

## Act 1 *The CIA practices on Cuba after the Revolution*

*"... (Castro's regime offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas."*

Arthur Schlesinger  
U.S. State Department  
April 3, 1961.

The story starts on January 1, 1959 when the Cuban Revolution took place. Fidel Castro, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and the Revolutionary movement established a new government. Equality, race integration and hope are some examples of the driving forces behind the movement that eliminated the oppression of the Cuban people by the Batista dictatorial regime.

After the massive support of the new revolutionary government, the Cuban-US relations were disrupted. Cuba, as a sovereign country reestablished strong diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1960. The relationship with the two sovereign countries began with trade agreements. As a response to this action, the US suspended the sugar quota for Cuba. Castro answered this by nationalizing the property of US citizens and the private companies.

The fissures on the relationship began to open. The US showed the overwhelming power that they thought they had by pushing an attack in 1961 called the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Sponsored by the CIA, Cuban-American reactionaries and mercenaries tried to overthrow the Castro regime. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs Invasion displayed the power and genuine popularity of the Cuban government. It was a discredited policy in the US by the discretion promoted during the Kennedy administration. Also, other policies appeared on the scene. The violation of the Cuban airspace was one preferred practice of the CIA. This is always justified by national security and might often be without national command authority.

Practices like bombings on sugar mills from airplanes were used. How often did they target this invasion of Cuban airspace against the agricultural sector? Often since 1959 and their main purpose was to subvert the political structure by using coercive measures that limited the

free trade with other countries. It was a practice that the US embargo on Cuba enforced in 1960.

Can these destructive measures achieve their main purpose? The reality is that investment from other nations supports Castro's regime. The European Union, Canada and Mexico are some examples that show the reality of foreign investment with no direct competition. The US economic embargo helps this and contributes to the survival of Castro's regime. Thirty-eight years in power is the best evidence of survival.

The Cuban sugar cane fields represent an important component of the Cuban economy. An American democratic government (US) supported bombings, fires and bacteriological spills on Camaguey, Las Villas, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio provinces.

When we analyze the attacks, a question arises. Who dictates the national security of a country? This can be answered in a simple way: "a sovereign country constructs its national security definition in regards of its particular situation." This is the main reason the US enforced the Monroe Doctrine in its own way.

### ***The United States National Security on the International Environment***

*"...Whereas we may use the Socialist credit for our industrial development in any way we believe best, the U.S. gives credit to Latin America in such a manner that the credit is only received if it is invested in a way that the U.S. accepts or believes convenient. That is the difference between colonial credit and a credit that promotes development."*

Ernesto "Che" Guevara  
March 9, 1961

The US tried to eliminate Castro and his communism by different paths, always based on the national security environment. Since the beginning, the US has never recognized the sovereignty of Cuba or its leaders by eliminating diplomatic relations. With this disruption going on in 1961, Prime Minister Fidel Castro declared him as a Marxist-Leninist. This creates assimilation between Cuba and the USSR that eventually formed a bipolar world.

The Cold War is a consequence of the bipolar world. Cuba, very close to the "empire" (90 miles from Florida, US) in geographic terms, was extremely close to the other (USSR) in military and economic relations. By this, the Cuban Revolution was placed on the spot, gaining attention that reflects fear from the Latin American neighbors.

The US effectively persuaded the neighbors with a precise mechanism. In other words, the mechanism awoke a "fear" in Latin American neighbors to a sovereign Cuba supported by the USSR. The facts categorized this a "persuasive action" by the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS. The mechanisms of exclusion and promotion of fear by the US are essentially economic, engaged with the theory of dependence.

Was the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS an authentic practice? Did all the Latin American countries that broke relations with Cuba illustrate US special interest on national security?

The authenticity is very hard to prove. A disruption of relations with Latin American neighbors occasionally occurred after they held support. Chile is a great example. They broke relations after Pinochet extirpated the socialism and President Salvador Allende.

The US expressed their awareness in 1960 for the intervention of the "international communism" on the American continent. They condemned Cuba by this and decided to adopt an anti-communist resolution.

US economic reforms on Latin America were used as a persuasive measure to neutralize communism in the Americas. Puerto Rico is one example. Luis Muñoz Marín, a pro-US governor was used to show the world how a Commonwealth developed the "window of democracy" created by the US and approved by the residents of Puerto Rico. Operation Bootstrap created Puerto Rican infrastructures that satisfied necessities temporarily and increased the persistent status problem. They constructed jobs and basic services such as electricity, aqueducts and telecommunications on the island, always based on the dependency to the US. (Fernández, 193) Some experts, such as, José Trias Monge called this "the oldest colony in the world." (Trias Monge, 1)

Peru, Venezuela and another Latin American countries were included on the dependent economic reforms. These examples show the nonexistent authenticity of Latin American countries positions toward

Cuba. They were used as puppets to ensure the US stage of national security.

These puppets on the US national security stage voted for the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS in 1962 because of its support for "subversive activities" in Venezuela. The measure was approved fourteen to one with six abstentions. Regarding this vote of exclusion, another resolution was also adopted. This was prohibiting OAS members from selling arms to Cuba. Setting measures for collective defense against Cuban activities in the hemisphere was the main purpose. To this fact, Demetrio Boersner states: "Immediately, the VII OAS Forum on Costa Rica was opened to consider the request made by Peru (but inspired by Washington) of studying the demands on the hemispheric solidarity regarding the recent events." (Boersner, 161) As a response to this, Cuba blamed the OAS and proclaimed their strong relations with China and the USSR.

The Cuban-USSR relations increased the Cold War tensions. Cuba, acting as a satellite of the Soviet Union, tried to show the US their apathy toward American imperialism. The Cuban missile crisis was a show of force by Cuba to the US policy. This show of force was held to gain respect and to be engaged with the other "empire" (USSR). Nevertheless, if Castro is against imperialism, why did he depend on the former Soviet Union?

All the negative US behavior toward Cuba increased the Castro-USSR satellite policy. The negativeness on both sides placed the world in jeopardy by the Cuban missile crisis that endangered the lives of millions of human beings. The crisis almost blew up the stage of the play, but the explosion did not happen and we are alive in a world that can resolve problems in a reasonable way.

## Act 2

### *The Cuban Security and the Result of a Simple Equation*

*"...The Cuban Revolution is not for export, revolutions occur because of internal conditions, but Cuba is an example that may prove to be helpful."*

Fidel Castro

April 1959

A negative and a negative give a negative result (- - = -). The US-Cuban relations represent this equation. The result, negative increases in the relationship. The back and forward is the main characteristic of this fractured relationship. Cuba and the US, the two main characters look to each other with anger, exposing an impossible compromise on the decades of perennial confrontation.

By using the equation, the pride of the main actors allows only for the back and forward relation. As Francis Fukiyama states in the *End of History and the Last Man*, "Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they feel shame and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel pride." (Fukiyama, xvii). That means that if both nations developed the negative and negative pride equation, it is because they recognize the high level of correct behavior within each actor. The result is an increase of negative pride that does not allow to mutual understanding.

Both nations since the Cuban Revolution illustrate opposite goals. The US fought against communism in Vietnam and the Cuban government supported the Vietnamese sovereignty. Also, the Cuban intervention in Africa was a solidarity that had a positive rebuttal on the Cuban race integration. To this Cuban internationalism and the US reaction, Eduardo Gonzalez states:

"In quick succession between 1975 and 1978, the military victories of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Angola and Ethiopia catapulted Cuba onto the international stage as a world-class actor, heightened its prestige in Africa and the Nonaligned Movement, and elevated Castro's standing in the Third World. Because its military and political triumphs advanced Soviet interests in the continent as well, Cuba also gained materially by obtaining far higher levels of Soviet economic and military assistance than in the pre-1976 period. In effect, Cuba



assumed a special relationship as a privileged 'super-client' of the USSR." (Shaw, 210)

This competition between the two nations was a show of pride that increased tensions. Castro used the Cold War era for the exposure of pride that the Cuban people need for the support of the Revolution. The Soviet Union supported this Cuban pride by the dependency that they developed on the 'satellite' policy.

Manifestations of the equation occurred when the US tried to eliminate communism in Vietnam. This was a war that nobody won. On the other hand, Cuba acted as a satellite of the USSR, completely dependent on the Soviet Union that disappeared in the '90's. The fall of the Soviet Union that had the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as an economic block, placed the Cuban Revolution floating in the air. This fall of the USSR also depicts the elimination of tensions between Cuba and the US. The economic integration into the global market system characterizes the post-Cold War era and Cuba is becoming a part of it. Still, the US economic embargo does not allow to that goal to be achieved. By this, the Cuban pride and the Castro justification to stay in power with all his errors is based on the US economic embargo. In other words, the national anti-Yankee behavior increases with the tightening of the embargo.

The US national security that shows the Cuban government as a threat in the post-Cold War era, has adverse effects. This illustrates the US economic embargo as a threat to the Cuban people that supported Castro for almost four decades. Now, in the post-Cold War era, who is a threat to whom?

To this adverse policy, Washington has publicly promised that its armed forces do not threaten Cuba, in line with the Interamerican Dialogue's special report, Cuba in the Americas: Reciprocal Challenges, recommended, "Havana cannot feel secure since her powerful neighbor seeks the overthrow of her political system through the application of coercive economic sanctions. This is clearly the case, despite all protestations of peaceful intent included in US official statements in Cuban policy." (Shaw, 165) It is clear by this that the anti-Yankee behavior is sustained by the anti-embargo policy that all the Cuban people have on their heritage. The anti-Yankee and anti-embargo doctrines are the main reasons why Fidel Castro is still in power.

The counterproductive measure by the US is productive for Castro in Cuba. The demolition of two civilian airplanes in 1996 is the best example. A Cuban-American organization named "Brothers to Rescue" sent two airplanes for "humanitarian" operations. This humanitarian practice was the throwing of anti-Castro propaganda from the airplanes. Castro and Cuba's Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias or FAR) warned the pilots, but they refused to quit. A Cuban MiG-29 opened fire against them and both planes were demolished. This event occurred in Cuban airspace.

The Cuban ruler took this show of force as a national demonstration for social integration. In addition, they enforced the economic embargo that the "Torricelli" Cuban Democracy Act already carried out consequently to this. The US response of pride is called the Cuban Solidarity and Democracy Act, and it appears on the scene with a nickname of "Helms-Burton Act." Yet it is important that he waits until Act 3 appears on the scene.

Emilio Pérez, from the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, D.C., explains in detail the consequences of this event.

"The lascivious US policy ensured the anti-Yankee sentiment. These practices unify and radicalize the Cuban people. Cuba is an independent nation and without a bilateral understanding, this will always be a perennial war. The US economic embargo policy is a fear that the Americans have if they lift it. It is the old pressure casserole theory, we are guilty because it is our fault. Those two civilian airplanes violated the Cuban airspace and we used the same argument that the Americans always used regarding the national security. Do you think that if Castro sends an airplane to Miami, the US is not going to destroy it? This Cuban-American practice looks like the ill-fated Playa Girón Invasion. We deserved respect, and we are prepared for everything."

Cubans are prepared for defensive attack only. Their pride sentiment against the US is so high. A procedure was developed in case an invasion takes place. Anti-American sentiments increase with the economic difficulties that the embargo pushes. The Cuban defense procedure is called the "All People's War Doctrine" (Doctrina de la Guerra de Todo el Pueblo) in which the people fight against a possible US invasion. To this doctrine, Carlos Alzugaray on the Cuban Security in the Post-Cold War World: Old and New Challenges and Opportunities express:

"The main tenets of the Cuban Military posture (Doctrina de la Guerra de Todo el Pueblo -All People's War Doctrine-), first developed underpinning stress that, if Cuba prepared the whole population for protracted resistance, a future war would become so costly in human and material terms that the hostile country would desist in its aggressive intent." (Shaw, 166)

Explaining it in detail, the difference between defensive and offensive attacks is necessary. Castro and the armed forces are prepared for the defense of their pride and their soil only. That defense is against the threat that represents the economic embargo, the invasion of Cuban airspace and another 'imperialist' behavior that increase the anti-Uncle Sam's sentiment on the Cuban heritage. Still, those group of interest accomplish imperialist behaviorists used for the dissolution of Castro's regime. Cuban-Americans represent the groups of interest with the CIA that used to work together for the 'democratic' goal. It is understandable by this, that the CIA is only a fragment of the US system with a full mercenary payroll that dream on the overthrow of Castro's regime.

An offensive attack by the Cuban people would be impossible to execute. Their low capabilities regarding weapons and army utilities in the post-Cold War era illustrate that Cuba is not a threat to the US. The collapse of the USSR has caused severe problems for the Cuba's Revolutionary Forces.

These include:

- Weapons and other equipment procurement reduced almost to nothing.
- A shortage of spare parts;
- The strength of the FAR being cut by half,
- Fewer periods of training;
- Shorter service time;
- Shifting troops to agricultural and tourism support. (Kleplak, 25)

In contrast with the two civilian airplane situation and the Helms-Burton Act accomplishment, the actors that are fighting on the scene are the Cuban-Americans and Castro's Cubans. The US tries to be in the middle with President Bill Clinton working on a possible compromise. This mean that Cuban-Americans fight offensively against Cuba that is going to respond defensively. Can an actor named Cuban-American dictate the main actor foreign policy? They can push legislation to promote confrontation, but cannot necessarily dictate a foreign policy that does not allow a rational solution. The Graham (D-FL) Amendment introduced in the US Senate, is a clear example. This amendment accuses Cuba of a "hostile policy" toward Washington and asserts that the "USA, as a sovereign nation, must be able to respond to any Cuban provocation and defend the people and territory of the US against any attack." (Kleplak, 25)

A big difference exists between a military threat and other types of threats to the US national security. Cuba is not a military threat to the US, but they can be a threat in immigration issues. A military threat and immigration threat are completely different things in which Cuban-American leaders take advantage and propel a confusion idea of the real situation. Nevertheless, the facts and a critical analysis provide an answer to night-wing leaders that support the Graham Amendment. Otherwise, if someone believes in a 90-mile far enemy policy, then they should support the Graham Amendment. When this measure is compared with the facts, the military threat beliefs turn irrational and incoherent.

Vickie Plunkett, legislative assistant on defense policy from the office of Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) Ranking Minority Member on the National Security Committee, US House of Representatives, exposed a precise view about this issue.

"Cuba is not a military threat to the US national security, but they can be on economic and immigration terms. In the House of Representatives National Security Committee, Cuba is not an issue. I never see any hearings or briefings about this. Some people think that the Florida Representatives position is the US foreign policy. Cuban-Americans are segregated on a repressive policy toward Cuba. The President is the one that can accomplish the US foreign policy. The Helms-Burton Act and the Graham Amendment are an individual policy of certain groups and it is not an US policy. That is why President Clinton can suspend indefinitely (not eliminate) the Helms-Burton Act

with the proposals for normalization that are arising. Concerning the Guantanamo Base, the US should stay if the normalization stage starts to ensure the process."

Now it is observable that the negative equation is turning to Cuba.<sup>1</sup> Americans and Castro's Cubans as the only exponents. The problem rests on the Helms-Burton Act and the Graham Amendment, in which the same President that is arguing for normalization measures signed both legislation. Can this equation be eliminated from the scene? Helms-Burton appears on the scene for the explanation and its implications on the international scene. Jump on the stage with Title III and IV, controversial character!

### Act 3

## *Title III and IV, Explanation and its Implications on the Globalization Era*

*"...The European Union and the U.S. share a continuing desire to help turn Cuba into a responsible member of the international community, but, the Helms-Burton Act is not the right way to achieve that goal."*

Sir Leon Brittan

European Union Trade

Commissioner

July 31, 1996.

Titles III and IV are relevant in the international environment. They attach not only Cuba, but also other economic characters as the European Union, Canada, Japan and Mexico. It also hurts the US, because the economic embargo represents no competition for the other actors that were already mentioned. This is the main reason the Helms-Burton actor will explain only the titles regarding the exposure of the extraterritoriality of the law.

The third Title centers in the punishment of those who have used American property seized during the Cuban Revolution. It allows that any person or government that 'traffics' in trades, invests in, or expands confiscated US property is liable for monetary damages in US federal district courts. This provision establishes a private 'right of action' for the US citizens to receive compensation for the current market value of

such property, or its original value plus interest (whichever is greater), plus reimbursement from the trafficker for court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. However, the President has the authority to delay the enforcement of Title III indefinitely, in successive six-month periods, if he decides that it is necessary to the national interests of the US and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.

The most important factor about the law is the power that the President has for the suspension of this section. That power justifies the extraterritoriality of the law because its performance can be used to obtain a compromise with third party nations. This is a mechanism to resolve eventual disputes between the US and its economic partners.

As an enforcement to Title III, Title IV establishes the mandatory denial of visas to individuals who traffic in confiscated property, or are corporate officers of shareholders of an entity involved in the confiscation, trafficking or unauthorized use or benefit from confiscated US property, are denied access to the US for residence, business or travel. Exemptions to this provision will be made on a case-by-case basis only to allow entry for humanitarian medical reasons or to face litigation under Title III.

These measures purport to end the Castro regime by ensuring that third party nations should respect US domestic law. During enforcement, the US invests a tremendous amount of its resources, including political capital to attain its goal of removing Castro from power. (Lisio, 694-695)

With the tightening of the economic embargo on Cuba, it is observable that the failure started in Act I of the play. This failure is the main goal of the US toward Cuba, the dissolution of Castro's regime. Also, the inclusions of other actors on the scene illustrate the US as an economic dictator. All this on an era in which the globalization dances as a priority for most of the nations.

The globalization's dance on this Act has a foreign reaction toward the Helms-Burton actor. US allies such as Canada, Japan, Mexico and the European Union (EU) nations have strongly criticized the enactment of this legislation. In the American hemisphere, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a resolution against Helms-Burton legislation on June 4, 1996. They also ordered the Inter-American Juridical Committee to examine the legislation and to reach a conclusion about whether it is valid under international law.

In contrast to Act 1, the OAS in Act 3, likes to dance the globalization agitation. The Helms-Burton actor prevents this dance and the OAS challenges the extraterritorial barrier by concluding that the law is not in conformity with the international law.

Another actor argues with Mr. Helms and Mr. Burton. The European Union had been pursuing its case at the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which it was challenging the Helms-Burton legislation. The Clinton Administration had vowed to boycott a dispute settlement panel formed on the issue because it believes the WTO has no competence to rule on a matter of US national security and foreign policy.

Oh! US national security appears on the scene! In Act 2, it was revealed that Cuba is not a threat to the US military national security. Still, this argument allows confusion about which threat it can be. The US can use the economic and immigration threats explained in Act 2 to eliminate the WTO intervention.

As an impartial organization, the WTO agreed to a EU request for the formation of a dispute settlement panel. They named the panel on February 20, 1997, over the objections of the Clinton Administration, which said that it would not appear before the panel. Nevertheless, they agreed. With the agreement, both sides will promote democracy in Cuba. They will work together on agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and other governments. Consequently, they accomplished a bilateral compromise with the strong European Union character. They suspended its WTO dispute settlement case. Therefore, they carried out the most important part of the agreement. The US would not take action against European companies under Title IV visa restrictions and President Clinton would continue to suspend use of Title III lawsuits. (Sullivan, 10)

The third party nations showed the world their concerns on economic development in the globalization era. Disputes like this placed the Helms-Burton actor in a precarious position by its extraterritoriality and low genuine behavior (Cuban-Americans segregated repressive policy). Changes are arising in the Cuba-US relationship. The EU-US disputes smack Mr. Helms and Mr. Burton face with the normalization and integration idea that the globalization supports. Some new characters are hanging around the stage for the promotion of a rational

solution. These characters replace the injured Helms-Burton actor. They are replacing an illegitimate character that does not allow for the main principles of the globalization era. It is time to act, rational characters!

#### Act 4

### *The Rational Solution*

*...The world should open to Cuba and Cuba should open to the world"*

*Pope John Paul II  
January 1998*

The visit of Pope John Paul II to Cuba is a great example of how change could arise. A long-term atheist, Castro, opened Cuba to the Catholic leader that argues for democracy in a communist regime. Some people call this change in Castro's point of view an "illegitimate practice." Time Magazine expresses this:

"Even after communism has imploded in virtually every other corner of the planet, Castro remains faithful to the end, a true believer in a god that failed." (McGeary, 28-29)

Castro can accept that god failed, but his change of thought allows a positive conversion to international recognition. The Pope attacks the US economic embargo on Cuba and he believes in a real transition to democracy. Is a change like this illegitimate? The Pope's position and Castro's action represent a fact that everybody can observe. The people with critical analysis can develop a real and authentic thought that will accomplish a behavior of compromise.

A positive behavior is observed in the US Congress with two House resolutions. These are S. 1391 by Senator Dodd (D-CT) and H.R. 1951 by Congressman Torres (D-CA). Both, the Senate and the House bills seek to end the ban on commercial sales and exportation of food, medicines and medical equipment to Cuba. (Remnack, 3)

The other House Resolution is the Free Trade with Cuba Act (H.R. 3173) presented by Congressman Rangel (D-NY). This bill is for "the lifting of the embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes." The performance of these rational actors might be the beginning of a transitional era. A normalization of four decades of fissures and the

integration of Cuba to the rest of the world allows to the globalization goals. Everybody wants investment and all the world deserves economic development.

As a precise way to ensure the solution to the dilemma, a Defense Department assessment has found that Cuba's military does not pose a national security threat to the US. They have delayed this report's release while officials consider that might bring in line with though US policies on the country.

The Washington Post reports on this:

"The report in part concludes that the Cuban armed forces have been significantly diminished, that they gear its military toward defending Cuba rather than making offensive moves." (Priest, A-13)

With the release of the report, another important change arises. The US accepts that Cuba is not a threat to the national security anymore. Castro replies to this:

"It was an objective report by serious people. It was crazy, really, to think that Cuba constituted a danger for the United States." (Wash. Times, 17)

With an answer like this, the play is turning to a possible environment of compromise. The actors in Act 4 have similarities among each other that will allow the new millennium goal: Economic Globalization. Now, the actors are finishing their performances and the stage is full of new ideas for a real understanding between two great nations. Cuba and the United States have the tools for a mutual understanding. The Globalization Era is the new scenario that provides in theory an eventual increase in economic income provided by trade relations. This will eliminate some theories that for almost forty years illustrate Cuba as David and the US as Goliath. Both can become economic partners that will benefit in all areas. Cuba is opening to the world and the US is reviewing its entry.

"Normalization and Integration to the economic globalization!"; the main characters shouted. Cuba and the US are starting to achieve their goals: a decrease in pride and an increase in aspirations for economic trade and development

## Endnotes

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